Ethical naturalism, the theory claiming that natural facts and especially facts concerning human nature play a justificatory role in ethics, is not very popular amongst moral philosophers. Especially in countries where Kant's influence is large, the charge of naturalistic fallacy is often made against it. The aim of this paper is to show that this charge misses the point: every ethical theory is at a certain level based on pure facts, natural or not, and natural facts concerning human nature are particularly suited for this role. The arguments in favour of ethical naturalism rely on a concept of human nature that includes basic desires related to ends we ought to pursue, as Aristotle and the Scholastics already saw long ago.
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Let me expand a little this last remark. When A objects x to B, B can answer directly or not. Among indirect replies, one consists in showing that A commits x too. I will term such a reply a Tu quoque's argument. In this paper, I will have recourse more than is usual to such arguments; they will not show that EN is correct, because they are not able to do it, but they will show that EN is not worse than its opponents. I will be more direct and positive too.
To begin with the charge of NF, some clarifications are in order. First, what is EN? Like all -ism, it has several meanings; but as I will consider EN in this paper, it consists in this main thesis, pertaining to what Anthony Quinton has named 'the central problem of ethics, that is the discovery of a criterion for the justification of judgments of value ' (1966, p. 136-137) :
EN: When you are summoned to justify an action, a judgement of value (concerning an action, a behavior, an institution or a trait of character) or a moral norm, it is not inappropriate to invoke a natural fact (more precisely: a natural fact concerning human nature or condition).
It is a thesis about normative justification: what reasons do we have to act
and to judge as we do? As I will conduct my analysis on this normative level, I
will not enter into the metaphysical aspects of the relation between facts and values. More importantly, normative justification is not psychological justification or motivation. Of course, there are many links between them and normative justification is not without effect on the psychology of decision. For instance, Kant demands that our actions conform to the categorical imperative factually (justification) and intentionnally (motivation). But the two are conceptually distinct, as is clear when we hear utilitarians argue that the principle of maximisation of utility justifies our actions, but must not be understood as a motive of action. In this paper, I will never be concerned by the psychological level of motivation.
On this normative level, NF states:
NF: When you are summoned to justify an action, a judgement of value or a moral norm, it is quite inappropriate to invoke a natural fact.
The reason for that is that it is not possible to derive norms and values from facts. Take this practical inference (A):
1. Every human being desires to be happy.
2. Therefore society ought to promote the happiness of every human being.
Such an inference is a fallacy, because it introduces in 2 a deontic verb 3 (ought to) without any corresponding semantic ingredient in 1: so the deontic character of 2 is without justification, it is like manna falling from heaven. To become a valid inference, we must add to A another premise. So we have (B):
1a. Every human being desires to be happy.
1b. Human desires ought to be satisfied.
As I hope is now clear, the struggle of EN against the charge levelled by NF . Of course, not any natural fact: as morality concerns human attitudes and deeds, it will be facts pertaining to human beings, for short, what the philosophical tradition has named 'human nature'. Moreover, not any human fact will be adequate to do this job; as we will see, appropriate facts will be facts internally related to ends or purposes. But I can't jump so quickly to these conclusions.
It is easy to see that the reformulation of the above practical inference (B) does not settle the problem we are confronted with when we are inquiring about moral justification. If B is not a fallacy, it is in need of justification too: why, can we ask, is there an obligation to satisfy human needs? Of course, the problem is here no more a formal one, it is a substantial one, and it is not without interest to note that, often, the charge of NF is a hidden way to dismiss a philosophical thesis and to promote another one (Birnbacher, 1990, p. 75) . So, let us forget NF and ask about 1b the same question we have asked about 2: if the deontic character of 2 is justified by the deontic one of 1b, the deontic character of 1b is in turn without justification, it is like manna falling from heaven. So, what could count as a justification of 1b, i.e. of the deontic character of our moral judgments?
Before proceeding, two remarks are still in order:
1° Moral language has two domains: we speak about values and about norms. In the following I will not explicitely distinguish these two domains 1 It is the title of a book by Christine Korsgaard: The Sources of Normativity (1996) (Rundle, 1979, p. 337) .
Some Ends We Pursue Naturally
What does count as a justification of 1b, i.e. of the deontic character of our moral judgments? Human nature, EN says.
In the history of western thought, such a thesis has often been voiced. For sure, it has even been the dominant one before Modernity. So it is not necessary for me to begin from scratch and I will start with a thesis professed by scholastic thinkers, from Aquinas onward. It is the thesis that human beings are driven by four fundamental inclinations and that these natural inclinations are the source of morality in human affairs. These inclinations (i.e. dispositional natural desires) are the following:
1. The desire to live 2. The desire to procreate 3. The desire to know 4. The desire to live with human fellows (Timmons, 2002, p. 70) There are similar desires in non-human animals, but as animals are devoid of reason, they do not manifest them in the same way. For example, human procreation and animal reproduction aim at the same goal, but they are lived I think that the first part of this thesis is uncontroversial. Of course, the pursuit of these ends takes many forms, depending on the social and cultural surroundings we live in; but this is quite natural too, because of 4. So our argument starts, and controversies with it, as soon as we ask, following the second part of the above thesis: are there natural ends we ought to pursue?
Natural Ends We Ought to Pursue
This too is in a sense not very controversial: even Kantianism which is usually considered as an anti-teleological doctrine, presents some ends as obligatory, i.e. the perfection of oneself and the happiness of others. And it is not surprising, because action is internally linked with end: every action aims at something. Therefore, the question is: which ends ought we to pursue?
Kantianism could nevertheless disagree with the natural character of those ends, because it considers nature as essentially related to inclinations and desires that have non-rational aims. Implicitly, this is already an answer to the question:
which ends? But we must not be too hasty. To pass from matter of fact to duty is to commit crude NF. Moreover it is often a very dubious philosophical move. Think of the position of classical utilitarianism. In an attempt to justify the moral imperative that we ought to maximise the happiness of all, it is sometimes argued that if we must do it, it is because we all want to maximise our own happiness: normative utilitarianism is justified by universalizing psychological hedonism. But the truth of psychological hedonism is not evident, to say the least.
More deeply, the fact that there are certain ends we ought to pursue does not seem to be unambiguously tied with their natural character. As Elliott Sober states: 'I want to suggest that to the degree that "natural" means anything biologically, it means very little ethically. And, conversely, to the degree that "natural" is understood as a normative concept, it has very little to do with biology. ' (1986, p. 234 It follows that differences between moral doctrines does not consist in differences between the form of the arguments they employ, but between the 9 content of the justifying premise. They disagree about the nature of the justifying fact: which fact has normative force or authority?
A very widespread answer is, as we have already seen: volition, divine or human. That is not surprising, because in human affairs, will is the power to issue orders and commands. Of course, any act of will does not possess this property; to possess it, will must have acquired authority. But will is, so to speak, the natural bearer of authority.
Another widespresd answer is: reason. Reason is linked with norms (the norms of rationality, and for many philosophers, rationality and morality are intimately related) and with authority, too. For Kant, will is simply practical reason. Usually, we distinguish the authority of will (deontic authority) from that of reason (epistemic authority) (Bochenski, 1979, p say which non-moral good is to be promoted, protected or honoured 5 , that is which non-moral good acquires the status of a moral one (which non-moral good counts in or for morality) and so becomes a normative principle of action (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 24-25) . Will and reason can do that, but nature? It seems hopeless, because natural belongs to non-moral: a natural good is a non-moral or pre-moral good. So a non-moral good is a good we often value naturally; we are wired to value it and as is well-known we are wired to value a lot of dubious moral things.
But, looking more closely, it is not as hopeless as that, because:
1. Will and reason are not such great sources for morality.
2. The different meanings of 'nature' give us some hope.
First, the perennial theological debates about the priority in God of his will over his reason and the calvinist thesis that God could have ordered us to hate one's neighbour show that will alone may not be a good candidate. And this is stressed if we move to the human realm: will must neither be arbitrary, irrational, nor evil, for it to have moral authority -Kant distinguishes sharply between Wille and Willkür; John Harsanyi excludes irrational and evil preferences from the felicific calculus and Christine Korsgaard states: 'The ability to reflect puts the will in a position of self-command' (1996, p. 220) 6 .
Should we then conclude that rationality is the rightness-conferring property? It is the contention of many philosophers from the Kantian and Utilitarian school (Donagan, 1977, p. 215) ; but this claim too has been hotly contested.
Second, some domains of naturality seem not so bad suited as bearers of moral authority. Think of moral sentiments and especially of sympathy and benevolence, emotions and traits of character that are at the source of morality in David Hume and the Scottish school 7 . The Scholastics we have mentioned 11 spoke of four fundamental inclinations that possess moral authority, and it seems not an absurd idea to give our desire to live a high moral standing; is not this desire in good place to justify the right to life? More generally James Griffin thinks that moral force belongs actually to some desires: 'We have to get behind desires and expectations to the deeper considerations that show which desires and expectations have moral force ' (1986, p. 40) . 'Behind', because not all desires and expectations are normative, but only those linked with basic or fundamental human needs. What then is the criterium to classify a need as basic or fundamental and why is the basic character of these needs conferring value? Ultimately, the naturalist answer is: because they are tied to our essential nature. So, those natural ends we ought to pursue and cultivate would be those ends that are tied to our essential nature.
Ends that Are Tied to our Essential Nature
Essentialism is not a well-accepted doctrine; usually it is even rejected without argumentation. But on reflection it is easy to see that nobody can escape a soft form of essentialism, because as Bochenski told long ago in a debate in France with Quine, to separate the essential from the accidental is only to recognize that there exists different strata in (our apprehension of) reality (1962, p. 184-185 ). If we, as a species, could not discern the essential from the accidental, we had disappeared for long! In the same spirit, everybody acknowledges that all the ends we pursue have not the same importance for the person we are (psychologically) or for the person we ought to be (morally).
But what is our essential nature and how can it have moral authority?
Alasdair MacIntyre, a well-known naturalist from the aristotelian camp, states:
'There is fundamental contrast between man-as-he-happens-to-be and man-ashe-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature. Ethics is the science which is to enable men to understand how they make the transition from the former state to the latter. ' (1985, p. 52) The argument is plainly aristotelian and distinguishes clearly between nature as what there is and nature as what we ought to strive to (our end or telos). And nature-as-telos, it is said, bridges easily the gap between good-will and approbation of mankind than beneficence and humanity, friendship and gratitude, natural affection and public spirit, or whatever proceeds from a tender sympathy with others, and a generous concern for our kind and species.'
'is' and 'ought'. EN's argument is now clear: action has a teleological structure and morally good action must aim at certain ends rather than others. What characterizes actions as right is their contribution to the ends that are essential to a human being in that they are characteristic and crucial to the being he is (Hurka, 1993, p. 9-14) . Those ends are therefore normative (in the sense that they are the source of moral authority: authoritative), they give our deeds a moral direction and provide justification for our moral beliefs. Truly, it is the life itself of living beings that is teleological: it aims at certain ends and the possession of those ends is not innate (although the capacity to reach them is innate and characteristic of living species). In a certain sense, this Aristotelian argument rejoins the sociobiologist position: each living being aims at survival, he wants to continue to live, but living the life of the being he is, that is, flourishingbiological nature becomes normative as far as it is tied with essential ends. Of course, ultimate essential ends are not objects of choice, as Aristotle stated (every human being wants naturally -so non-voluntarily -to flourish) and as Anthony Flew (1967, p. 143-148) critically remarked against some sociobiologists (if survival is our natural end, it is nonsense to urge us to survive), but the means and ways to aim at them -that is intermediate ends -
are.
Even a neo-kantian like Korsgaard presents the normative question along those lines: 'A human being is an animal whose nature is to construct a practical identity which is normative for her.
[…] When some way of acting is a threat to her practical identity and reflection reveals that fact, the person finds that she 14 must reject that way of acting ' (1996, p. 150 ). An animal is a teleological entity:
its nature imposes tasks on him because it wants to flourish. A human being is an animal of a peculiar sort, endowed with free will, so he can choose his identity (i.e. the ends that are essential for the being he wants to be); but not any identity can do the job and as a moral being, he must endorse the identity of a denizen of the Kingdom of Ends. My point is only to show that Human Nature is as good a candidate as God,
Will or Reason as the source of moral authority.
Several philosophers disagree. At this point, one argument is often voiced, pretending that human nature is not appropriate to explain the deontic character of morality. How can natural facts be at the basis of obligation? We can find such a charge in the writings of Richard Hare and of Charles Larmore. I cannot here answer to it in all details, because it would be necessary to investigate the nature of normative utterances and the relations between values (that are tied to ends) and obligations (Baertschi, 2001, p. 69-86) . But I think that the teleological character of human life, that enjoins us to become really human, can be a first good answer (nature gives us a task). Another part of the answer will soon be given, when I will speak of the requirements necessary to lead a good life.
You may fear that there will be a high price to pay for adopting EN: if our nature sets what we ought to do, what we ought to do will be in our interest, because fulfilling his nature is in the best interest of the doer. But is not morality essentially altruistic? I hope that a short answer will be enough here: yes, it is self-interested, but self-interest is an inescapable feature of morality. The christian hopes to live in paradise for ever if he acts rightly; the contractualist wants to make a contract, that is an agreement that is for the benefit of all, including himself; the utilitarian is not altruistic, but impartial, and, finally, why be altruistic if the interest of human beings were of no importance? (Singer, 1979, p. 208-216) . Of course, nothing here implies that self-interest must motivate actions; as I have said in introduction, nothing in my argument will pertain to the psychological question of moral motivation.
An action is right if it contributes to the realization of ends that are essential to a human being in that they are characteristic and crucial to the being he is, I have said. But in ethics, a lot of duties and rights we mention seem not to be tied to the essence of man, in that they pertain to basic needs we share with many non-human animals like needs concerning life, food, shelter and freedom from pain. Moreover, I have argued that the criterium to tell basic from non-basic needs was that the first were tied to our essential nature (as human animals); but if we follow MacIntyre, this claim misses the moral point, because what he says pertain much more to perfectionist needs than to basic ones. To do justice to this objection, I shall introduce a new distinction, that will bring my naturalist's argument to an end.
The Two Layers of Morality
MacIntyre's realization argument is illustrated by Mulhall and Swift in the following way: 'We can move immediately from the knowledge that a knife is blunt and bent to the conclusion that it is a bad knife, and from the fact that it is sharp and evenly balanced to the judgement that it is a good knife ' (1996, p. 79) 9 . But it is a little too hasty as a rendering of the argument from function (ergon in aristotelian language). A bad knife is a knife, but a picture of a knife is not a knife (remember the commentary on the famous painting of René
Magritte: 'This is not a pipe'). If you make a 'knife' with paper (for that you would practice origami), it is not a bad knife; it is not a knife at all. To be a knife, an object must have the function of a knife: it must be able to cut; if it has not this capacity, it is not a knife, but something else, depending on the function it has. It is exactly the same with human beings: a morally bad human being (a moral fool, to speak à la Mill) -an evil one -is nevertheless a human being (and not a pig): he has human telos, but he does not succeed to attain it well. Rational and volitional powers like autonomy are capacities attached to the possession of this human telos, and they are at least partly constitutive of the ontological status of human beings, often named his moral status (Baertschi, 2008b, p. 77-78) .
Because of the developmental characher of human life, human beings, that is beings possessing a human telos and the capacities to attain it, can fail to reach it and stop somewhere in between.
This developmental character implies human functioning at two ends:
beginning and achievement. For the beginning, some goods must be available (like food and shelter, but like liberties, too); without them, the capacities to lead one's life cannot be put in action, and this beginning can repeat itself several times (think of health and the institution of health care to help human beings, as far as is possible, to function well and to be 'repaired'). That is the lower layer of morality, so important for Human Rights and for human dignity (it is the source of many duties towards others, and maybe towards oneself). understanding on a common conception of justice ' (1971, p, 186) .
Because of the fragmentation of value, some domain of it may not be covered by the argument from teleological nature, except in a trivial sense:
when confronted with any normative demand, we can always answer that we are so wired that we tend to respect it. But this is too short an answer. 
Conclusion
By these last remarks, I don't want to suggest that every moral doctrine is a type of ethical naturalism, openly or in disguise, even if it seems to me that it is not possible to develop a complete moral theory without any recourse to some 19 claim about human nature in the center of the justification's process (in 1b and not only in 1a). Kant himself, when he contrasts conflictually nature and reason, excludes in fact not so much human nature as such than its non-rational part.
But there is a long way from that to a thorough naturalism and its fundamental principle of telos.
In the end, I hope to have made a good case in favour of the thesis that EN is not in any worse position than the other main ethical theories, because:
1. Every moral theory needs to call for some basic factual premise in the process of justification.
2. The conception of a teleological nature is not problematic if properly constrained.
3. Duties toward others are not more difficult to account for in naturalism that in other moral theories.
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